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REASONING ABOUT COMPETITIVE REACTIONS:  
EVIDENCE FROM EXECUTIVES 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Much of the empirical research on competitive reactions describes how or why 
rivals react to a firm’s past actions, but stops short of examining whether managers 
attempt to predict such reactions, which we call strategic competitive reasoning.  In three 
exploratory studies, we find evidence of managers’ thinking about competitors’ past and 
future behavior, but little incidence of strategic competitive reasoning.   Competitive 
intelligence experts and other experienced managers assessment of the results suggests  
the relatively low incidence of strategic competitor reasoning is due to perceptions of low 
returns from anticipating competitor reactions more than to the high cost of doing so.   
Both the difficulty of obtaining competitive information and the uncertainty associated 
with predicting competitor behavior contribute to these perceptions.   The paper suggests 
both a need for research on competitive behavior and an opportunity to influence and 
improve managerial judgment and decision making. 
REASONING ABOUT COMPETITIVE REACTIONS:  
EVIDENCE FROM EXECUTIVES 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Thinking strategically is a foundation of modern business and competitive 
strategy, yet is increasingly difficult in a dynamic environment.  Day and Reibstein 
(1997) identify two strategic errors that companies often fall prey to in the face of a 
dynamic business setting, strategic interdependence notwithstanding:  “the failure to 
anticipate competitors' moves and the failure to recognize potential interactions over 
time” (p. 8).   We characterize the first failure as managers' failure to anticipate 
competitors' likely actions, and the second as managers' failure to anticipate competitors' 
likely reactions to their own moves.  
Beginning with the work of Zajac and Bazerman (1991), a strong conceptual case 
has developed suggesting decision-makers often do not effectively conjecture about their 
competitors’ future behavior, particularly their rivals’ reactions to their own decisions 
(see Deshpande and Gatignon 1994; Hutchinson and Meyer 1994; Moore and Urbany 
1994; Reibstein and Chussil 1997; Urbany and Montgomery 1998).  Anecdotes about 
failures in considering competitive reactions abound, yet there is little or no evidence 
about how and to what extent managers account for competitors in their decision making.  
Not reasoning about rivals’ reactions might be perceived as harmless in the eyes of those 
who would contend that either 1) such “non-strategic” behavior would correct itself over 
time, or 2) the link between such conjecturing and performance is ethereal at best.   Here 
we explore two questions: 1) to what extent do practicing managers consider competitors 
and their anticipated reactions when deciding on their own moves, and 2) how do 
experienced managers account for the answer we get to question 1?  Heeding Laurent’s 
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(2000) pleas for more concern about the external validity of marketing models and for 
more qualitative input into those models, we went into the field to gather evidence from 
practicing executives.  This paper reports our results and provides food for thought 
regarding future research and pedagogy in the area of competitive response. 
2   COMPETITIVE REASONING 
 
We define competitive reasoning as the assessment and consideration of 
competitors that serves as an input into the firm’s decision-making.  We recognize that a 
manager might simply ignore the competition, behaving strictly as a monopolist.  This 
assumes that the success or failure of a decision depends only upon the company's 
capabilities and customers' response, not on competitors’ actions or reactions.  Leeflang 
and Wittink’s (1996) observation of limited competitive reactions in an apparently 
competitive environment may reflect this tendency.  
Competitive reasoning, if it happens, can take three forms.  First, managers may 
study their competitors in a manner that results in a description of the competitor (say, the 
competitor's goals, strengths and weaknesses, assumptions, strategy, past and current 
behavior, and so forth, (Porter 1980)), but stop short of making predictions about the 
competitor's future actions.  Second, managers may make predictions about competitors' 
behavior, but only about actions, not reactions.  Third, managers may specifically 
consider how their competitors are likely to react to their firm’s own decisions.  The third 
form of competitive reasoning is what we refer to as strategic competitive reasoning.  
Strategic competitive reasoning goes beyond both describing competitors and predicting 
competitors' future moves. It involves stepping into the shoes of the competitor and 
predicting the competitor’s reactions to one’s own moves  (see Dixit and Nalebuff 1991).  
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 Stepping into competitors’ shoes can require a great deal of cognitive effort and a 
significant amount of information about competitors that is often neither readily 
accessible nor routinely collected (cf. Jaworski and Wee 1993).   Consider the pieces that 
would have to be in place for a manager to think strategically about a competitor:  the 
manager must be aware of the competitor’s moves and countermoves, make the 
appropria te attribution regarding motives behind the moves, and accurately distinguish 
between competitor moves that are reactions and those that are independent moves 
(Moore and Urbany 1994; Clark and Montgomery 1996).  These insights may be difficult 
to obtain for a variety of reasons, e.g., limited move-countermove sequences (Meyer and 
Banks 1997), delays between action and reaction, competitor responses in a different 
market (Ailwadi et al. 2001, Leeflang and Wittink 1996), short managerial tenures and 
poor organizational memory (cf. Adams et al. 1998; Day 1991; Huber 1991).  
 Further, competition is only one of many factors managers must consider in 
strategic decision-making.  Many of the other factors, however, do not suffer as severely 
from the information and inference problems associated with reasoning about 
competitors.  For example, managers may have greater confidence in information about 
internal company factors such as cost, capacity, and budgets.  Information about 
customers may be more readily available and can be tailored for the decision at hand.  To 
the extent that customer and internal company information are perceived by managers as 
more vivid, more available, less debatable, more reliable (after all, competitors may 
attempt to mislead), and less costly in terms of financial resources, time, and cognitive 
effort, greater attention will likely be paid to customer and internal decision factors (cf. 
Culnan 1983; Day and Wensley 1988; O’Reilly 1982).  Profiling competitors’ past 
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behavior can be difficult; predicting competitors' future behavior is much more difficult.  
Predicting competitors’ future behavior that is a response to any particular action of the 
focal firm is doubly difficult and open to internal challenge.  Thus, managers may 
perceive there are better uses of limited resources than trying to resolve uncertainty about 
competitors’ future behavior, especially their potential reactions. 
3   PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER 
            In the field of competitor interaction, a developing body of literature seeks to 
explain competitive reactions post hoc.  This literature generally characterizes the 
likelihood of competitive reactions to a firm’s action as a function of  a) the 
characteristics of the firm taking the action (e.g., market size, reputation; Bowman and 
Gatignon 1995, Venkataraman, Chen, and MacMillan 1997), b) the characteristics of the 
action (e.g. scale of entry, market responsiveness, visibility; Chen et al. 1992; Dickson 
and Urbany 1994; Leeflang and Wittink 1992),  c) the characteristics of the rival (e.g., 
size, performance, desired reputation, organizational responsiveness; Smith et al. 1989; 
Gatignon and Reibstein 1997), and d) environmental characteristics (e.g., turbulence, 
market growth, industry concentration; Ramaswamy et al. 1994; Robinson 1988; see also 
Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin 2001).   
 While this work illustrates that competitive reactions may be predictable to some 
degree, it provides no insight into whether or how managers seek to predict competitor 
behavior in their decision-making.  In the many contexts where competitor choices do 
affect firm outcomes, not considering competitors’ actions ex ante is likely to lead to 
poorer decisions and poorer outcomes.  For instance, Clark and Montgomery (1996) 
found that 79 percent of actual competitor reactions were not even perceived by a firm’s 
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managers, and this oversight had significant negative consequences for performance.  
Our goal here is to explore whether practicing managers incorporate competitor behavior, 
particularly the prediction of future competitor reactions to their own moves, into their 
own decision-making in strategic marketing settings.   
4  THE STUDIES 
  In this section we describe three studies that examine the incidence of 
competitive reasoning in marketing decisions, based on responses from practicing 
managers.   The goal of the first and second stud ies was to find out whether managers 
who were asked to describe factors that were important in past and prospective decisions 
would spontaneously mention considering any type of competitor behavior, with a 
particular interest in the incidence of strategic competitive reasoning.   The third study 
addresses the perceived plausibility of the results of Stud ies 1 and 2 by soliciting the 
reactions of a different group of practicing managers to the results observed in the earlier 
studies and their explanations of these results.   
5   STUDIES 1 and 2:  THE RELATIVE INCIDENCE OF TYPES OF 
COMPETITIVE REASONING 
 
5.1   Study 1-Method    
Design and Respondents.  One hundred-seven guided interviews were conducted 
by MBA students (approximately half were executive MBA students and half were 
daytime MBA students) at two national universities as part of a class assignment.   The 
students identified the respondents-- managers who were involved in either a decision to 
change price for their product/service or the development and introduction of a new 
product during the previous year.  We distinguished pricing decisions from new product 
decisions for two reasons.  First, pricing decisions, contrasted with other strategic 
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decisions, are more visible, occur more frequently, and can more easily be linked to sales 
and profit outcomes.  Second, research has shown that pricing decisions are more likely 
than non-pricing actions to evoke competitive reactions (Venkataraman, Chen, and 
MacMillan 1997) which we feel increases the likelihood that competitor reactions will be 
considered ex ante.  The objective of the interview was to obtain insight into the factors 
that drove decision-making regarding each move.  The students submitted a one-page 
write-up of their interpretation of the interview for class discussion, along with an 
appendix with the verbatim (or near-verbatim) account of the respondent’s answers.  
Complete information was obtained for 101 respondents.  Of these, 44 were new product 
development decisions, and 57 involved pricing decisions.1  The student interviewers 
were blind to the purpose of the study, although the interview itself was structured.  
The firms represented by respondents ranged from small local businesses to major 
package goods firms. Seventy-nine percent described their firms as either market leaders 
or major players.   On average, respondents reported 3.36 serious competitors in their 
markets.  Forty-four percent described the ir market’s reaction patterns as “swift,” while 
roughly the same proportion (40 percent) indicated that competitors tended to “wait-and-
see” before reacting.  Fourteen percent indicated that competitive reactions were often 
minimal.   These background factors had no moderating effects on the answers discussed 
below.  
Procedure.  The interviews were exploratory in nature, with the students 
instructed to ask questions about the timing of the price change/product introduction and 
                                                 
1 In several of the interviews, respondents discussed the pricing of a new product.   When pricing 
received the predominance of discussion, these cases were categorized as pricing decisions.  
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to obtain a retrospective account of the key considerations in the decision.  Specifically, 
once the interviewer and interviewee had identified a particular decision made in a 
specific line of business and segment, the following questions were asked:  
Q1:  Thinking back to the time when this particular decision was made, what were 
the key considerations in the decision?  That is, what issues did you consider 
specifically before you made the final decision?  
 
Q2:  Let's say that you were considering a similar move in this same market 
today.  What questions would you ask yourself as you're deciding to make the 
move?  
 
Coding.   A coding scheme was developed based upon several iterative readings 
of the transcripts.  The reports were coded for whether 1) no competitor considerations 
were mentioned, 2) competitors' past or current behavior was considered, 3) expectations 
regarding competitors' future behavior were considered, and 4) the account included 
consideration of competitors' future behavior as a reaction to the focal firm's move.   The 
following “non-competitor” factors emerged as considerations in the managers’ decision-
making and were coded as well:  customer/channel factors (needs, preferences, etc.); the 
market in general (overall market size, potential market size, primary demand); internal 
factors (e.g., the firm’s sales/revenue/share targets, financial goals, capacity, capabilities); 
and “other” factors (e.g., regulatory considerations).  
  Two coders were trained on a separate sample of 18 interviews.  They then coded 
each interview using these categories, coding separately the retrospective account of the 
decision (the respondents’ answers to Q1 above) and the prospective account (Q2).  The 
coders each coded the cases separately and then together resolved any discrepancies.   
Prior to the resolution, average coder agreement was 77 percent and 78 percent for the 
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retrospective and prospective accounts, respectively.   Inter-coder reliability, following 
Perreault and Leigh (1989), was 0.86 for both scenarios.   
5.2 Study 1 Results  
Figures 1a and 1b show the frequency with which managers' mentioned 
considering internal factors, customer factors, market factors, and competitor factors in 
their retrospective and prospective accounts, respectively, of either a new product 
decision or a pricing decision.    The last three blocks of Figures 1a and 1b provide more 
detail on the nature of the competitor factors that were considered by those who 
mentioned competitors.   The total percentage of respondents mentioning competitors is 
the sum of three components: 1) the percentage who mentioned only past or current 
competitor behavior, 2) the percentage who mentioned expected future competitor 
actions but did not mention expected future competitor reactions, and 3) the percentage 
who mentioned expected future competitor reactions.   
                                [Figures 1a and 1b here] 
 For all types of decisions (retrospective and prospective new product and pricing 
decisions), internal considerations (e.g., costs, profit goals, capacity constraints, human 
resources) are mentioned by the greatest percentage of respondents.   Customer factors 
and competitor factors (aggregated) were mentioned with approximately equal 
frequency.  However competitor factors receive a greater emphasis in pricing than in 
new product decisions.  This was true for both retrospective and prospective decisions.  
The most interesting observation is that expected future competitor reactions are 
mentioned more often in the prospective decision accounts than the retrospective ones 
for both pricing and new product decisions, although the difference between 
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retrospective and prospective decisions is not significant for new product decisions.2   
Thus, more respondents forecast they would engage in strategic competitive reasoning 
for future pricing decisions (18 percent) than reported doing so for the recalled pricing 
decision (5 percent; Z=2.83, p<.01).   Several respondents expressed regret in not having 
done so when the decision was made, which suggests a perception of potential bene fit 
from more active competitor reaction considerations, at least for pricing decisions. 
 Summary.  In sum, Study 1 indicates that while managers do report considering 
competitors in their decision-making, competitive considerations focus primarily on  
competitors' past or current behavior rather than competitor reactions.   Study 
limitations, such as the use of multiple interviewers, limited control over interview 
transcripts, and some sources of uncontrolled heterogeneity in respondents and their 
firms, dictated that we check the robustness of our results.   Study 2 applies the coding 
scheme developed in Study 1 in a more controlled environment and focuses specifically 
on prospective decisions.  Table 1 contrasts Study 1 and Study 2 on important design 
characteristics. 
                                                [Table 1 here] 
5. 3   Study 2--Method 
In Study 2, we determine whether the Study 1 results generalize to another, very 
different setting in which executives are asked to describe prospective decision-making in 
three familiar and personally relevant scenarios.   Industry differences are held constant, 
as respondents are asked to focus on decision-making in a common, simulated 
                                                 
2  Contrasts were at least significant at p<0.05 except as noted.  
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environment, Markstrat3.   Importantly, we know with certainty that a firm’s outcomes 
are substantially affected by its competitors’ actions in this simulation, removing a source 
of variability that may have been present in Study 1.  
Design and Respondents.  Respondents were 47 executives participating in the 
Sloan Executive program at a major university.   The executives in the Sloan program are 
hand-picked fast-risers in their organizations.  Those participating in this study averaged 
36.2 years old with a range of 30-52 years.  Forty-two percent were from the U.S. and 85 
percent were male.  These managers, who were participating in the competitive 
simulation Markstrat3 during one of their course modules, were presented with three 
separate decision scenarios and asked to articulate the factors that would be considered 
by the team in making three kinds of decisions.  The scenarios included deciding: a) 
which of several market segments to focus on with the team’s next new product (market 
selection), b) whether to increase the advertising budget, and c) whether to cut price.    
All respondents provided responses to all three scenarios, which were counterbalanced 
across the questionnaires.     
Procedure.  Following period 3 of the Markstrat3 competition, the Sloan 
executives were presented with a questionnaire that contained questions about the three 
types of decisions described just above. To illustrate, the advertising scenario was 
presented as follows:  
You’re a member of a Markstrat team that is making a decision about whether to 
increase the advertising budget for an existing Sonite brand.  Faced with 
uncertainty, your team plans to sort through several issues and factors which will 
influence the success or failure of the target advertising decision.  What are the 
factors that you would consider in making this advertising increase decision?   
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Coding.  The prospective decision protocols were coded by two coders who were 
different from the coders used in Study 1.  The same coding framework was used.  
Across the market selection, advertising, and pricing scenarios, inter-coder agreement 
was 0.87, 0.89, and 0.85, respectively, leading to reliabilities of 0.92, 0.94, and 0.91.  
5.4   Study 2-Results  
Figure 2 presents the percent of managers who mentioned internal, customer, 
market, and competitor factors as considerations in prospective decisions in the 
MarkStrat3 context.  The last three blocks of Figure 2 provide details regarding the type 
of competitor reasoning that was mentioned.   Similar to Study 1, we find that, in general, 
reasoning about competitors involves consideration of past and current behavior most 
often, and consideration of future reactions occurs least often.  However, substantially 
more of the respondents in Study 2 mentioned competitor factors.  (More of them 
mentioned internal, customer, and market factors as well.) Interestingly, the increase in 
strategic competitive reasoning from Study 1 to Study 2 comes from an increase in 
considerations of competitors' expected future actions, as the proportion of managers in 
Study 2 who considered competitors’ past/current behavior and competitors’ future 
reactions is quite similar to the proportion that did so in the prospective decision setting 
of Study 1 (Figure 1b).   As in Study 1, the managers in Study 2 mentioned considering 
strategic competitive reasoning much more often for pricing decisions than for the market 
selection and advertising decisions  (Zs = 2.09 and 2.62, both p<.05). 
    [Figure 2 here] 
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5.5  Studies 1 and 2--Summary 
We observe assuring consistency in results across Study 1 and Study 2, which 
examine very different decision environments with different research approaches, as 
reflected in Table 1.  The evidence thus far supports the expectation that managers attend 
far less to future competitive reactions in their decision-making than might be expected 
based upon traditional economic theory.    In fact, these results are so contrary to such 
theory that one might worry that methodological concerns account for the results.  
Rather, we believe the similarity in results across these two diverse studies provides 
greater confidence in the conclusions that emerge.  For further insight regarding why so 
little conjecture about competitive reactions is observed, we turn to Study 3, in which 
experienced managers assess and offer explanations for the pattern of results observed in 
Studies 1 and 2 (based upon their own experience).  
6    STUDY 3:   CONSIDERING THE RESULTS OF STUDIES 1 AND 2 
 
        In Study 3, executives were asked to assess the plausibility of the pattern of results 
that were observed in Stud ies 1 and 2.  We presented our aggregate results to three 
different samples of executives—two sets of experts and one set of generalists, and 
obtained their assessments of the plausibility of the results, and their insights into 
explanations of the results.  
6.1 Study 3-Method 
              Design and Respondents.   In this study, 96 experienced managers responded to 
a survey that presented a summary of the combined results from the earlier studies 
described above.  The expert sample included an e-mail sample of 14 execut ives in 
research, corporate intelligence, and consulting functions, and 16 Marketing Science 
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Institute trustees.   The generalist sample consisted of 66 executive MBA students at a top 
10 Executive MBA program, with an average 11.5 years of work experience.  The 
executive MBA students represented a wide range of industries, including 
telecommunications, financial services, automotive, photographic, high tech, 
food/grocery, and industrial products; and a wide range of functions within their 
organizations, e.g., marketing, finance, human resources, engineering, product 
development, legal services, and so forth. 
Procedure. After a preliminary series of open-ended interviews with four 
executives to pilot test our approach for collecting the Study 3 data, we deve loped two 
versions of a short questionnaire -- the first an e-mail questionnaire that was administered 
to the first sample of 14 executives.  This sample was identified primarily with the 
assistance of a competitive intelligence professional actively involved with the Society of 
Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP).  The sample included executives who 
were among the leaders in the field of competitive research nationally.  Nearly all of 
these respondents were currently or had been chief competitive intelligence (CI) 
professionals in their organizations.  Several worked for very large organizations with 
well-established CI functions or were consultants in CI.  The second two groups were 
presented a paper and pencil version of the e-mail survey; the MBA group in a classroom 
setting and the MSI trustees at a semi-annual board of trustees meeting.   
As noted, respondents were presented with either a questionnaire or an e-mail 
survey.  (Those receiving the e-mail survey were first contacted by telephone).  The 
survey first discussed the general objectives of the research (i.e., “We are interested in 
examining what factors managers tend to focus on in decision-making and why.”) and 
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then presented results for the overall ranking of the decision factors based upon the first 
two studies.  Each factor was defined in detail, and the following aggregate percentages 
of managers from studies 1 and 1B who considered the factors were provided to 
respondents: internal factors (89 percent), customer factors (82 percent), market factors 
(65 percent), past or current competitor behavior (56 percent), expected future competitor 
behavior (16 percent), and expected future competitor reactions (6 percent).  The primary 
objective was to determine whether respondents found the relative emphasis on these 
factors (reflected in the frequency of mention) to be consistent with their own experience.  
In addition, we wanted to tap into their experience by requesting their explanations for 
the observed results.   While our particular interest is in the low incidence of 
considerations of future competitive reactions, we chose not to focus our respondents 
exclusively on that particular aspect of our results.   
Measures.  Respondents were asked to assess the results of Studies 1 and 2 using 
three 10-point bi-polar scales anchored with the labels unexpected-expected, surprising-
unsurprising, and inconsistent with my experience-consistent with my experience.  
Following this, they answered three open-ended questions that asked them to 1) explain 
their ratings on the three items, 2) provide an explanation, based on their experience, for 
the rank order results (if they had one), and 3) provide an explanation of why future 
competitive reactions receive greater mention in pricing decisions than for other 
decisions (again, if they had an explanation).  
Coding.  The executives’ open-ended explanations were content-analyzed by two 
coders.  The authors developed a coding scheme for the results based on several readings.  
The categories that emerged are presented in Table 2.  
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    [   Table 2 here  ] 
 The rate of coder agreement varied across the categories, from 65-100 percent.  Across 
categories, average agreement was over 90 percent and overall reliability was 0.956.  All 
disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
6.2   Study 3-Results 
Plausibility Ratings.  The three items used to measure respondents’ assessment of 
the rank-order results presented in the survey had an alpha of 0.84 and were averaged to 
form an overall plausibility scale.  There were no significant differences in the mean 
ratings of the three executive sub-samples (F2,95 = 0.92, p = 0.40), so results are 
aggregated across the groups.   The overall mean was 7.30 (standard deviation = 1.94), 
with median 7.67 and mode 8.33.  The mean response is significantly greater than the 
scale midpoint of 5.5 (Z=9.18, p<0.01) which suggests that the respondents were, on 
average, positive in their plausibility ratings.  Seventy-one percent of the sample 
averaged ratings of 7 or above (48 percent averaged 8 or above).    
 Framing the Explanations.   A useful framework to organize the factors that 
emerged to explain limited competitive reasoning is presented in Table 3.  This 
framework identifies factors that may reduce the value ascribed to the practice of 
competitive reasoning by raising the perceived costs of doing so or by reducing the 
perceived returns from doing so.   Table 3 uses this framework and presents the results of 
the coding, indicating how often the various factors were offered as explanations for the 
results observed in Stud ies 1 and 2.   The number in each cell indicates how many of the 
respondents mentioned the factor, either as an explanation for their reactions to the 
overall rank order or as an explanation for the results of Studies 1 and 2 (i.e., Questions 1 
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and 2 in the Measures section above).  The responses of the experts (MSI Trustees and 
competitive intelligence professionals) are distinguished from responses of the generalists 
(the executive MBA students).    
[   Table 3 here   ] 
 
 The results for the two groups are very consistent.  The simple correlation 
between the experts and the generalists for the percent mentioning each of the eleven 
items of explanation in Table 3 is 0.92, p< 0.01.  In addition, the Spearman rank order 
correlation and the Kendall Tau B rank order correlation between the two groups for the 
eleven explanations were both significant (0.92 and 0.66, respectively, p< 0.01).  
6.3   Study 3-Discussion: Factors Influencing the Value of Competitive Reasoning 
 Factors Raising the Perceived Costs of Competitive Reasoning.   Respondents 
frequently mentioned the difficulty of obtaining competitive information.  Two 
predominant dimensions of the costs of competitive analysis emerged.  The first is related 
to the accessibility of information about competitor behavior and was mentioned by 11.5 
percent of all respondents.  The second dimension addressed the difficulty of competitive 
analysis even if competitive information was available (mentioned by 12.5 percent). 
These might be financial costs, cognitive costs , or time-related costs. 
 The data suggest two reasons why the costs of gathering and analyzing competitor 
information, especially that required for strategic competitive reasoning, may be 
perceived to be high.  The first is the limited opportunity to actually learn about 
competitors which was mentioned by 10.4 percent of the respondents.  Respondents 
suggested this limitation may be due to infrequent observations, the delay between an 
action and its reaction, or the time pressure associated with the decision.  The second 
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reason that emerges is risk aversion, which was mentioned by 10.4 percent of the 
respondents.   
 Factors Reducing the Perceived Returns from Competitive Reasoning.  The 
most often mentioned factors associated with reducing the perceived returns from 
competitive reasoning are irresolvable uncertainty, the greater importance of internal 
factors and customer factors, and the decision-making culture of the firm.  
  Irresolvable Uncertainty.   This category bears special consideration, as it 
is an outgrowth of the high perceived costs of gathering and analyzing competitor 
information.  When firms have limited information about competitors, we would expect 
there to be significant uncertainty about competitor behavior, both past and present.  Yet, 
even when information is available about competitors’ past and present behavior, there is 
likely to be uncertainty about competitor’s potential behavior.  Uncertainty may have 
many sources, and it is generally human nature to avoid it (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985).   
One response may be to apply simple decision heuristics to deal with the uncertainty of 
competitors’ future behavior, as mentioned by 18.8 percent of our respondents.   For 
some, approximation may be “good enough.”   
  Other Factors are More Important.   In the face of uncertainty about 
competitors’ future actions and reactions that cannot be resolved, our respondents appear 
to make an implicit trade-off that favors more certain inputs in their decision-making.  
One of the dominant themes in the verbatim comments was that factors that could be 
assessed with greater certainty -- typically internal factors -- tended to receive more 
weight in decisions.  This was true for both the experts (90.0 percent) and the gene ralists 
(89.6 percent).  Customer factors, while not as certain or easy to measure as internal 
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factors, were mentioned as “more important than competitor-oriented factors” by 53 
percent of both the expert and the generalist groups. 
 The Culture of the Firm.   The detailed responses provided three potential  
explanations for the dominance of internal factors.  All three are associated with the 
organizational culture that provides the context for competitive decision making: 1) the 
firm’s focus on the short-run, especially short-term Return on Investment; 2) the greater 
appeal of factors that one can control; and 3) the need to justify one’s decisions 
internally.  While we were not surprised by the emergence of firm culture as a factor that 
would affect the perceived value of strategic competitive reasoning, we were surprised by 
its importance.  Firm culture was mentioned by 81.3 percent of the total sample; 76.6 
percent of the experts, and 83.3 percent of the generalists.   
Low Perceived Returns vs. High Perceived Costs.  We expected factors that 
would reduce the value (and thus the incidence) of strategic competitor reasoning by 
lowering the perceived returns to be mentioned about as often as those that would raise 
perceived costs.  However, Study 3 respondents put a much greater emphasis on 
explanatory factors associated with lowering perceived returns than those associated with 
raising the perceived cost (Table 3).  The four items mentioned by more than fifty-
percent of the respondents (overall and within each group) are associated with low 
perceived returns to competitor reasoning.  Not only are factors associated with lowering 
value by lowering potential returns rank-order-dominant, but they are mentioned by a 
dramatically greater proportion of the executives than factors associated with perceived 
costs.  To the extent that the executives’ explanations inform us of their collective 
experience, this result suggests that the rarity of strategic competitor reasoning is due 
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more to a lack of potential returns than a concern for costs, be they financial, cognitive, 
or time-related costs.  It is also significant to note that of the low-returns-related 
explanations, Limited Interdependence is the least often mentioned (by far! at 2.1 
percent).   Thus, the a priori obvious explanation that little competitive reasoning was 
observed because little or none was appropriate, was not a popular explanation.  The 
alternative explanations mentioned by the executives were offered in the context of 
competitive interdependence.  
 Contrasting the Experts and the Generalists.  Although the overall results are 
quite consistent between the experts (MSI Trustees and Competitive Intelligence 
professionals) and the generalists (executive MBA students from a variety of functional 
areas), there is one particularly interesting difference.   For all respondents, factors 
associated with increasing the perceived costs of competitor reasoning were mentioned 
much less often than factors associated with decreasing the perceived returns from 
competitor reasoning.  What is striking, though, is that the experts mentioned the 
increased-cost-related factors (on average, 21 percent) at three times the rate the 
generalists did (on average, 7 percent, Z=2.01, p<.05).  Our interpretation is that the 
experts were more likely to have experienced the effort and financial costs of assembling 
and analyzing competitor information, perhaps even having fought (unsuccessful) budget 
battles to support such efforts. The generalists, however, may not routinely or formally 
consider the costs of competitive reasoning.  Rather, the notion that not much can be 
gained from attempts to anticipate competitor behavior may have been institutionalized 
for the generalists.  
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 Pricing v. Other Decisions.   The explanations described above are answers to the 
first two questions our respondents were asked, i.e., to describe their reaction to the 
overall results of Stud ies 1 and 2.  We deliberately did not direct their attention toward 
the low incidence of competitive reasoning found in the first studies until the third 
question, which asked respondents why they thought the incidence of anticipating 
competitor reactions was greater for pricing decisions than for market entry, advertising 
budgeting, or new product decisions.  The reasons offered were consistent with past 
research and with out expectations.  Between 34 and 45% of the respondents mentioned 
each of four reasons why reasoning about potential competitor reactions is more likely 
for pricing decisions:  1) the firm feels the impact of a competitor’s reaction to pricing 
more quickly and more obviously than in other areas, 2) competitor information about 
pricing is easier to gather because of its visibility, and 3) competitor information about 
pricing, once gathered, is easier to analyze.   
7    SUMMARY OF THE THREE STUDIES  
Studies 1 and 2 examined managers’ reports of factors considered when making 
pricing, new products, market entry, and advertising decisions.  The data came from a 
wide variety of competitive contexts, providing sample breadth.  A more controlled 
environment in Study 2 provides depth.  Both studies yielded a similar conclusion:  
although competitor considerations are fairly widespread, Strategic Competitive 
Reasoning is, relatively speaking, a very rare occurrence.  As anticipated, Strategic 
Competitive Reasoning occurred more frequently in the pricing arena than the other 
decision areas. 
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 In Study 3, two additional groups of executives, one more expert and one more 
generalist, were asked to react to the results of Study 1 and Study 2 and offer reasons that 
might explain these results.  Overall, these executives were inclined to believe the results 
hold true in the “real” world.  They overwhelmingly felt (somewhat surprisingly) that 
explanations associated with perceived low returns to competitor thinking were 
substantially more important in explaining limited strategic competitive reasoning  than 
perceptions of high perceived costs.   
7.1 Subsequent Inquiry.   
 In order to assess whether these results are simply well known and consequently 
of little interest, we asked some one hundred-one participants at research seminars 
attended largely (over 80 percent) by marketing and economics academicians to predict 
ex ante whether executives would attribute the results (particularly the rarity of strategic 
competitor thinking) more to high perceived costs, more to low perceived value, or 
whether they would anticipate that these reasons would be roughly equally cited.  We 
invoke this procedure, albeit somewhat informal, in recognition that seminar attendees 
and readers alike are potentially subject to hindsight bias (Bukszar and Connolly, 1988).  
Nearly half the research seminar participants (46%) expected that high perceived costs 
would be the dominant reason given by executives. Sixteen percent of the seminar 
participants thought the reasons cited would be roughly equal.  Only thirty-nine percent 
correctly identified low perceived value as the dominant reason given.  Thus, it appears 
that the results are not well known, at least to these academic professionals.  The authors 
were also incorrect in their prior expectations.   
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8   DISCUSSION 
We began with the goal of exploring whether managers are inclined to consider 
competitive reactions, and why.  We do find a low incidence of Strategic Competitive 
Reasoning.   Based upon the subsequent study of executives, the clearest explanation 
seems to center upon uncertainty and decision justification.  That is, there is a general 
tendency to weight more heavily (or rely on more strongly) decision inputs that can be 
assessed more easily, predicted with greater confidence, are felt to be more controllable, 
and provide a stronger basis for justifying decisions within the organization (see Cyert 
and March 1962; 1992; Adams et al.1998).  Such behavior may be adaptive, even 
optimal. (For instance in markets with little competitive interdependence, Nash behavior 
is appropriate.)   Our interest is in situations when omitting Strategic Competitor 
Reasoning from the decision-making process may be harmful, despite its inherent 
difficulty.  
8.1   Uncertainty Reduction 
 The most significant reasons why expectations regarding competitive reactions 
(and other more qualitative considerations) may not be accounted for in decision-making 
is that such predictions are, by their nature, uncertain and ambiguous.  While the perils of 
being inwardly-focused have been discussed for some time (cf. Bonoma 1981), there has 
been little or no discussion of 1) how people may limit the ‘set’ of attributes or criteria on 
which they evaluate decisions, nor 2) how a tendency to favor more quantifiable, less 
ambiguous decision criteria may blind the management team to particularly diagnostic 
information.  To the extent that such processes represent natural adaptations to a complex 
environment (which under many circumstances they might), it is conceivable that they 
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reflect rational adaptive behavior.  We need to consider under which conditions such 
behavior is detrimental, that is when the failure to consider competitors’ reactions impairs 
firm performance.   
8.2 What Harm?  
 Are failures to conjecture always harmful?  Not necessarily.  In fact, managers 
who focus on competitor reactions when there is no need to do so may be wasting 
considerable time and effort.  If, however, managers are not anticipating competitor 
reactions and should be, the possibility of their being blindsided by a competitor’s 
reaction to a decision that was (otherwise) a good decision looms large (Moore and 
Urbany 1994).   Andy Grove (1999), for instance, suggests it may be worthwhile to be a 
little paranoid, i.e., to “…guard constantly against other people’s attacks (p. 3),” in order 
to keep the organization in fighting trim and to avoid unpleasant competitive surprises.   
Is competitive paranoia needless, costly behavior?  Interestingly, Clark and 
Montgomery’s (1996) results showed that (in a simulation) while paranoia didn’t help, it 
didn’t hurt.   Therefore, in the face of the potentially considerable consequences of being 
blindsided by competitors, paranoia may be the preferred mode, although ideally the firm 
would want to be “just right.” 
 We need to know much more about the conditions under which strategic 
competitive reasoning is important and when it can be safely ignored; that is, what level 
of reasoning about competitors is “just right.”  We need to identify and calibrate the 
antecedents and consequences of competitive paranoia, and of being blindsided.  We 
need to develop, and train managers to implement, strategies to overcome the managerial 
limitations suggested in this study, particularly in conditions where it is most dangerous 
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to ignore competitive response.    For instance, developing models of marketing 
competition that account for uncertainty about competitors and the resulting tendency to 
discount or possibly ignore potential insights about competitive behavior may be quite 
productive.     
 All of this, of course, rests on the presumption that strategic competitive 
reasoning is actually helpful, not merely “not harmful.”   This proposition, which is 
difficult to prove yet true almost by implication, drove our interest in why managers seem 
to do so little strategic competitive reasoning.  Nevertheless, the real value of strategic 
competitive reasoning to any firm will depend on a host of factors, some that raise its 
perceived value and others than lower it.   Here we focused on those factors that lower 
the perceived value.  It is equally critical to understand factors that enhance the perceived 
value of strategic competitive reasoning.  An important next step is to identify 
circumstances where the returns from thinking strategically about competitors exceed the 
costs of doing so.   
9  FINAL THOUGHTS 
 The stud ies presented here add to a recent stream of research that we hope gathers 
interest and strength.  Dekimpe et al. (2001) and Leeflang and Wittink (1996) each find 
that the most common actual response to competitors is "no response."  Recall also that 
Clark and Montgomery (1996) found that most competitive reactions were not even 
perceived by managers in a simulation and that such under-perception lowered 
performance.   Our results reiterate that attention to competitor reactions in decision-
making is limited, and suggest this may be driven largely by low perceived returns from 
thinking strategically about competitors. It is heartening to note that respondents in the 
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first two studies were more likely to consider competitor reactions in future decisions 
perhaps suggesting learning.  And, executives in Study 3 suggest that decision-makers 
better understand the positive returns from competitive intelligence as they become more 
experienced in using it.3   Thus, instituting processes that address the low perceived 
returns side of the equation may have an especially significant payoff.   To do so, we 
need to remove the blinders, from managers and academics alike.  We again second 
Laurent’s (2000) appeal for a part of the marketing research portfolio to be devoted to 
enhancing the external validity of marketing models and frameworks.  We hope that the 
research presented here might modestly contribute to that objective.    
                                                 
3  One president of a consulting firm in Study 3 noted that “Most North American executives are 
not very competitor-oriented or competitive intelligence ‘savvy.’  However, after appropriate 
intelligence education/orientation they quickly adjust to competitive issues and the use of 
business intelligence and, in my experience, become more sensitive to the competitive-dimension 
of their own business decisions and actions.”   Another intelligence professional in the petroleum 
industry noted that “…once decision-makers are exposed to good competitive intelligence and the 
impact it can have on improving the quality of the decisions one makes about the business, they 
will use and value competitive intelligence.” 
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 Table 1 
Characteristics of Studies 1 and 2 
 
 
CHARACTERISTIC STUDY 1 STUDY 2 
 
Industry Context Broad Narrow 
 
Markets Varied, real world 
 
Markstrat3 
Sample 101 managers, reporting on decision-
making in their company 
 
 
47 executives in a one-year 
executive MBA program 
Focal Decisions  New product or pricing 
retrospective and prospective 
decisions 
 
Advertising increase, price 
cut, and new market entry 
prospective decisions 
 
Interview Questions  What were the key considerations in 
the decision? 
 
What questions would you ask 
yourself if you were making the 
same decision again? 
 
Survey Question  What are the factors you 
would consider in 
determining ____? 
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   TABLE 2 
Coding Categories: Factors that May Decrease the Perceived Value  
of Strategic Competitive Reasoning 
 
CATEGORY DEFINITION 
Factors that May Decrease the Perceived Value of  Strategic Competitive Reasoning 
by Raising the Perceived Costs of Strategic Competitive Reasoning  
 
     Limited Information Availability Any mention of how easy or difficult it is to get relevant 
information 
 
     Processing Difficulty Any mention of how difficult it is to analyze competitor 
information 
 
     Limited Observations Any mention of how difficult it is to learn about competitors 
due to limited interactions, delay between action and effect, 
lack of time, and so forth 
 
     Decision-Making Tendencies Comments related to manager’ risk aversion or loss aversion 
with respect to gathering/ analyzing competitor information 
 
Factors that May Decrease the Value of Strategic Competitive Reasoning  
By Decreasing the Perceived Returns from Strategic Competitive Reasoning 
 
     Irresolvable Uncertainty Comments related to the impossibility of resolving uncertainty 
about competitors 
 
     Firm Culture Any mention of firm rules, processes, norms, or style that 
discourage competitor analysis 
 
     Limited Interdependence Any mention regarding competitors’ not having much effect on 
each other or the firm’s not having any competition 
 
     Decision-Making Tendencies Any mention of managers’ need to be in control or a tendency 
to be overly optimistic or overly confident with regard to 
competition 
 
     Effectiveness of Simpler                   
 Competitor Reaction  
       Heuristics 
Comments related to there being simpler, effective ways to 
make decisions than trying to predict competitor behavior 
     Internal Factors are More 
 Important 
Any mention of internal, company-related factors being more 
important considerations than competitor-related factors 
 
     Customer Factors are More  
            Important 
Any mention of customer-related factors being more important 
considerations than competitor-oriented factors 
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TABLE 3 
Explanations Offered for the Results of Studies 1 and 2 
(# and % of Respondents Mentioning) 
 
 
 
CATEGORY   MSI/CI     
      n=30 
 
   #             % 
    EMBA 
     n=66 
 
  #        %       
     TOTAL 
       n=96 
 
    #             % 
Factors that may Raise the Perceived Costs of 
Strategic Competitive Reasoning 
 
      
   Information Not Easily Available 
 
   6 20.0    5  7.8 11   11.5 
   Processing Difficulty 
 
   7 23.3    5  7.8 12   12.5  
   Limited Opportunity to Learn 
 
   5 16.7    5  7.8 10 10.4 
   Decision-Making Tendency: Risk 
      Aversion 
 
7 23.3 3 4.5 10 10.4 
Factors that may Decrease Perceived Returns  
From Strategic Competitive Reasoning 
 
      
   Irresolveable Uncertainty 
 
25 83.3 31 46.9 56 58.3 
   Limited Interdependence 
 
2 6.7 0 0 2 2.1 
   Decision-Making Culture 
      of the  Firm 
 
23 76.6 55 83.3 78 81.3 
   Decision-Making Tendencies: 
       Individual 
 
7 23.3 19 28.8 26 27.1 
   Simpler Heuristics Effective 
 
5 16.7 13 19.7 18 18.8 
   Internal Factors More Important 
 
27 90.0 59 89.4 86 89.6 
   Customer Factors More Important 
 
16 53.3 35 53.0 51 53.1 
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Figure 2  
Frequency: Decision Factors Mentioned 
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